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The future of youth is old age, and beyond. My aim here is not to forecast the social 
conditions for entry into the future labor market, in the 2020s say, but rather to analyze the 
consequences of contemporary problems (the scarcity of jobs, unemployment, the stagnation 
of wages, and so on) for the life chances of youth. I also analyze the first cohorts of adults 
socialized in the economic slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s to understand the long-term 
consequences of the crise.  This essay therefore focuses on the consequences of the 
(des)integration of youth in France in the context of mass unemployment and déclassement 
scolaire (over-education and diploma inflation). This French experience is interesting in 
itself.1 When put in comparative international perspective, however, we can see even more 
clearly the long-term difficulties facing a number of countries:  it is not just a matter of the 
sacrifice of the youth of today; early career problems create “scarring effects” in the future 
and pose risks for the future of welfare regimes.2  
 The aim here is to understand how the French welfare regime serves as an important 
factor in the emergence of cohort-based economic constraints that produce specific social 
generations.3  I highlight generational “scarring effects,” that is, the irreversible consequences 
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of short-term fluctuations in processes of socialization on the long-term life chances of 
different birth cohorts. These scarring effects can affect specific birth cohorts in countries 
where the welfare regime provides the context for increasing polarization between middle-
aged insiders and young outsiders and where young adults lack resilience in facing early 
career difficulties.  
 We examine the concept of “social generation” in relation to the distribution of well-
being and life chances, and we seek to understand how the French welfare regime can be 
undermined over the long-term by an unbalanced distribution of social benefits when the 
young become the first victims of economic downturns. The French case is marked by strong 
generational imbalances: as I will show, on account of the shift from the economic boom 
period of the trente glorieuses (from 1945 to 1975) to the era of  croissance ralentie (slow 
growth from 1975 to today), a generational rift (fracture générationnelle) emerged between 
the generations born before 1955 (the early baby boom generations and the previous ones, 
who benefited most from the economic acceleration of the postwar period) and those born 
after 1955 (who were victims of economic slowdown, high youth unemployment, and the 
social problems that came as a consequence). This fracturing entails, too, an “insiderization” 
of previous generations (socialized in the period of economic expansion) and an 
“outsiderization” of new ones. This fracture générationnelle is often denied by policymakers 
and in the public debate;4 however, the long-term implications of these generational dynamics 
may have major consequences for the stability of our welfare state. International comparison 
provides some useful benchmarks in this respect.  Scarring effects and the lack of resilience to 
early adulthood career setbacks appear to be more extreme in France, but they are occurring 
in a number of other countries as well.  
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Fragmentation of Youth(s) 
Youths (the plural is crucial) are the groups of people engaged in a process of “transitional 
socialization,” a period of time after “primary socialization” (as dependents in families and in 
school) and before “secondary socialization” (in the long-term life course of formed adults).5  
The problem nowadays is that the old institutionalized functionalist life course is gone.6 The 
process of transitional socialization is more and more fragmented, and many “adults” fail to 
obtain a stable independent status.  Not only is the process longer, more differentiated 
between the upper and lower middle classes; it is also less secure. Three stages of youth have 
therefore emerged:  a “first youth” with first experiences in transition, before age 25; a 
“second youth,” generally between age 25 and 30 years old, defined by partial social 
independence in the labor market7 and by long-term dependence on family economic support 
(because of the disconnection between wages and housing costs); and a “third youth” for 
those who fail in the process of transition, a social déclassement and a situation of never-
ending dependence on family solidarity, until age 35 or even later. 
 The social attainment of the new cohorts of young adults, moreover, is constrained 
by three important conditions.  First of all, the French system remains polarized by the 
distribution of two main resources―inherited economic assets (i.e., wealth), on the one hand, 
and educational credentials, on the other. Even if some fractions of the upper middle class 
have higher positions in both respects (as is common, for example, with physicians and 
lawyers), the two axes are highly differentiated and remain poorly correlated in France. In the 
welfare regime of the 1960s, the lower earnings of public-sector civil servants went hand-in-
hand with higher symbolic status and better access to subsidized housing, services, and 
consumption. Today, in the newer generations, the stable social status enjoyed in public 
companies or the civil service is highly valued and helps offset the mediocrity of wages one 
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can expect in these sectors.  The second constraint that has emerged is that education has 
become both more necessary and less sufficient as a condition for social success.  Personal 
investment of time, effort, and resources into education has become vital, but the “returns to 
education” cannot be taken for granted. The diplomas of highly selective grandes écoles have 
a stable value, whereas mass universities (including the many campuses of the University of 
Paris, and even the Sorbonne) produce legions of educational déclassés.  As a third constraint, 
the process of social attainment is concentrated in time, and any early mismatch between 
one’s diploma and one’s early post-graduation social position has huge consequences in terms 
of long-term life course in the labor market. 
 As a result of these constraints, we can observe a fragmentation of youth along 
three dimensions. The first dimension is age fragmentation: economic dependence in “first 
youth,” before age 25, is generally accepted, but it takes on a negative connotation during 
“second youth” (until age 30), and for “third youth” (after 30) it creates shame for the parents 
and a feeling of failure for the young. 
 The second dimension is family solidarity. Whereas in the 1970s in France, family 
support was quite neutral in its effect on status attainment (average wages, even at age 
twenty-five, were sufficient to cover the housing costs of standard young families), the 
economic resources of parents and their generosity are now crucial for young people.  Youth 
with similar earnings and from similar social milieus may have starkly different standards of 
living depending on whether they receive help from families for childcare, housing, access to 
a mortgage, and the like. 
 The third dimension is type of education and social context. At the top of the 
French social structure, elite grandes écoles alumni have experienced no strong 
transformation of their social status over the last forty years. Their transition from school to 
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work is still fast and linear.  Their couple and family formation process differs little from the 
experience of their predecessors in the 1970s. Family support is not crucial for these elite 
graduates, since independence in the stable job market is generally taken for granted. Gender 
differentiation is weaker than in other social groups, and is declining, even if women are more 
often oriented to the public sector and to skilled welfare jobs, and men to well-paid segments 
of the private sector. By contrast, the least educated strata8 is subject to extraordinary risks of 
unemployment. Youth of working-class origin leave school at an average age of 17 and begin 
to acquire some stability in employment at age 25 or later, and gender differentiation is 
strong. This means that in working-class milieus, the average age when a son or daughter 
finds economic independence and leaves the parental home is higher than in highly-educated 
families, where youth usually leave home before gaining a bachelor’s degree.  
 Between the end of school and the beginning of stable employment (when it 
happens) less well-off young people experience a long period of leisure with few economic 
resources:  they make up a stratum of money-poor and time-rich youth. In this group, ethnic 
minorities are overrepresented but are not the majority. Most participants to the 2005 riots 
came from this stratum and were either members of the “first youth” generation or elder 
“second youth” working-class sons who lacked a means of political or collective expression.9  
They had neither social visibility nor political commitment. If youth from this strata lack 
family support, they most likely feel a keen sense of exclusion.  For young people with 
moderate levels of education (typically the baccalauréat  or the “bac + 1”), the situation is 
even more complicated since social perspectives depend on specific factors, such as type of 
education (liberal arts versus marketable knowledge), the extent of potential family support, 
social capital, and the acquaintances parents have at their disposal.  A tradition of 
entrepreneurship can have a dramatic effect. Today in France, moderately-educated youth 
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from unpropertied families (the public-sector middle class, for instance) experience a high 
risk of economic marginalization when they fail to penetrate the public-sector employment 
system, where jobs are now scarce, or when they enter the informal art, culture, media, and 
journalistic sector.10 
   
Figure 1. The diamantine social space in the twenty-first century France 
 
 
 This social context can be explained to some extent by using the “diamantine 
scheme” of the French social class system.  The scheme combines Pierre Bourdieu’s 
conception of social space with Robert Perrucci and Earl Wysong “double diamond” class 
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downward, enlarge or diminish, and separate or agglomerate with neighboring categories. For 
instance, the left corner of “educationally déclassés” (over-educated poor) is much larger 
today than thirty years ago, when the public sector expanded to such an extent that it could 
absorb the moderately-educated youth of the early 1980s. Conversely, the “nouveau riche” 
corner on the right side of the scheme was small and marginal in the 1980s but has since 
expanded with the growth of small companies, mainly in high-tech development and 
computer-related services.  That said, many contemporary young “nouveaux riches” are not 
so new, in fact, since most of them benefited heavily from family support when their 
companies were created. 
 The fragmentation we have described creates a picture of youth today in France as a 
poorly organized age group. There appears to be a sharp contrast between the youth of the 
1970s and that of nowadays―between (the illusion of) a unified vision of the 1968 generation 
and (the reality of) contemporary fragmented youths.  A more accurate picture would depict 
the emergence in the recent period of a paradoxical generation defined by its lack of own 
identity, a lack that is precisely the source of its identity. This picture has strong empirical 
bases: whereas French youth of the 1970s gave the impression of embracing a cultural and 
political unity against the conservative right-wing governments and the cultural symbols of 
former social generations (notably the generation of the Résistance, the 50-something age 
group of 1968), today’s youth have developed no strong cultural or political symbols of 
identification with which to create an apparent unity to disguise its obvious and increasing 
diversity. Hence we need to probe more deeply, beyond the level of cultural and political 
expression, to see the forces at work in social generation formation in France today. 
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The Multidimensional fracture générationnelle in France 
The economic slowdown in France has provoked a dramatic multidimensional fracture 
générationnelle since the late 1970s.12 This portrait is grim, but it is founded on strong 
empirical bases, on robust analyses of standards and alternative sets of microdata offering 
convergent results. Three principal topics will be highlighted here: first, the economic 
marginalization of new entrants into the labor market and its direct effects on social structure; 
second, the long-term consequences of this deprivation in terms of socialization and life 
chances; and finally, the consequences for the political participation of these cohorts, and their 
support for the contemporary welfare regime.  
 
The Economic Decline of Youth 
The first aspect of the dynamics of social generation formation in France is the change in the 
cohort distribution of economic means. A large redistribution of earnings and incomes 
occurred between the seventies and today. In 1970, the earning gap between age groups 25-30 
and 50-59 was 18 percent; the gap has stabilized at about 50 percent for the past ten years. 
During the trente glorieuses, the young wage earners generally began in the labor market with 
the same level of income that their own parents enjoyed at the end of a complete career. For 
the past twenty years, we have observed the stagnation of the wages of the young, while 
wages for older people have grown by 20 percent or more. Here is a new social balance 
between age groups, whose consequences are not completely understood by social scientists. 
But it is not simply a change in the relative position of age groups: members of the elder 
generation (now, those at age 55, more or less) were relatively advantaged in their youth when 
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compared to their seniors, and now, too, when these seniors are compared to their young 
successors. The generational gaps result from double gains and double pains.  
Figure 2. Relative net annual wage by age group of the male population, 1964-2006  
(100 = average male population) 
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Source: INSEE Déclarations annuelles de données sociales (DADS)13  
 
 How can we explain this increasing gap? In fact, this is a consequence of changes in 
collective bargaining (or compromis social, meaning formal and informal decisions and 
agreements between social actors such as employers, trade unions and the state) that occurred 
during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This transition in the social value of generations 
shifted from benefiting newer generations, as a positive future we sought to invest in, to 
protecting stability for adults and seniors stability, even at the expense of the young. The main 
factor in the redistribution of well-being concerned unemployment. High unemployment rates 
were socially acceptable for young workers, provided that adult employees with dependent 
children could avoid these difficulties. In 1974, the unemployment rate of those who left 
school twenty-four months before, or less, was about 4 percent; by 1985, those who left 
school recently had an unemployment rate of 35 percent, which remained the case through 
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1996; in 2002, at the end of the recent wave of economic recovery, it was close to 18 percent. 
The unemployment rates of recent school leavers are strongly reactive to the economic 
situation, whereas the middle-aged and senior rates remain more stable: an economic 
slowdown has serious consequences for younger adults, and recovery first benefits new 
entrants in the labor market. Evidently, the perverse consequence of collective bargaining that 
leads to the protection of adults at the expense of newcomers is a lack of socialization of the 
new, sacrificed generations.  Even if they are now adults, with dependent children of their 
own, their unemployment rates remain much higher, and their earnings abnormally low, when 
compared to other age groups, because of a kind of “scarring effect.” At the end of the 
eighties, the unemployment rate of the group at age 40 to 44 was still about 4 percent and is 
now over 8 percent.  This “scarring effect” is even clearer concerning earnings: the cohorts of 
new entrants in the labor market in a time of downturn have to accept lower wages; 
conversely, for young workers, a strong economy allows them to negotiate better earnings. 
After this entry point, the earning gaps remain because of the lack of a catch-up effect on 
earnings: some generations are about 10 points above or below the long-term trend, because 
of the point at which they entered the workforce, and after age 30 the relative benefit or 
handicap remains stable.14  
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Figure 3.  Risk of unemployment for those who left school less than 12 months before 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Enquêtes emploi INSEE 1970-2005 microdata 
  
 A complementary factor relates to the dynamics of occupational structure and the 
stratification system. In France, as in the US, the standard hypothesis of stratification change 
suggests that the long-term educational expansion of the twentieth century, and the emergence 
of a knowledge-based society, have stimulated the enlargement of the middle and upper-
middle classes.15  Thus, the newer generation could have benefited automatically from the 
expansion of the occupational groups of experts, managers, or professionals (cadres et 
professions intellectuelles supérieures)16 to whom we often add middle management and 
lower professionals in the private and public sectors (such as school teachers and nurses).  
These groups exemplify the “new technical middle class” whose social hegemony was 
predicted in the seventies (professions intermédiaires in the official French nomenclature of 
occupations).  
 The cohort analysis of the expansion of this group shows that from the cohorts born 
in the 1920s to those of the 1950s the share of this group increased―from 27 percent to 42 
percent at age 50, for instance. This growth is significant and substantial, but two strong 
nuances must be underlined.  First, at age 35, we notice a complete stagnation from cohort 
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1945 to cohort 1975.  Second, the pace and slope of these transformations are much slower 
than in the case of mid-level diplomas, such as baccalauréat (at the end of French secondary 
education). From the eldest to the youngest, the share of baccalauréat owners increased from 
17 percent to 60 percent of a cohort.  
  
Figure 4. Male population with at least a baccalauréat  
  
Source: 1968-1975-1982-1990-1999-2006 Censuses INSEE microdata N=26 million on the 
original source17 
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white or blue collars, or unemployed, or out of the labor force altogether). The descriptive 
results given by the cohort diagram are validated by more rigorous models deriving from 
Age-Period-Cohort models.18  
Figure 5. Male population in middle-class positions and with no more and no less than a 
baccalauréat  
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All these results obtained on the male population have similar consequences for females: the 
situation of females improved from pre-baby-boom to early baby-boom generations, but later 
generations experienced greater difficulties.  
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Figure 6. Female population in middle-class positions and with no more and no less than a 
baccalauréat  
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Source: 1968-1975-1982-1990-1999-2006 Censuses INSEE 
 
 How, then, can we explain the following paradox?  The first educational boom for the 
early baby-boom generation did not produce diploma inflation (although access to the 
baccalauréat doubled, this educated population was absorbed by the job market), but the 
second educational boom (experienced by the cohorts born between 1970 to 1975) created a 
huge number of educated declassés. In the late 1960s, during the last third of the trente 
glorieuses, France experienced a dramatic expansion of the public sector and of high-tech 
large companies (manifest in such sectors as Airbus, France Télécom, nuclear energy, 
electricity, the health system, universities and research centers, and so forth), creating strong 
demand for highly qualified employees with higher education. The first cohorts of the baby-
boom (the 1945 cohort, which was thirty years old in 1975) were surely not a sacrificed 
generation since they enjoyed longer education in the context of a dynamic labor market, and 
they did not face the diminishing returns to education that subsequent cohorts have faced. The 
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second educational expansion has not been marked by strong labor market transformations. In 
this respect, the cohort born in 1970 has witnessed no clear progress in the social structure of 
jobs, despite massive educational development. During the 1990s, however, the 
socioeconomic situation for “seniors” (who were the former “juniors” of the seventies) 
improved significantly. Moreover, these elder generations kept the intrinsic value of their 
diplomas when they were 25: there is no competition between much more educated youth and 
poorly educated seniors. This means that in the corporatist regime (that is, the Bismarkian-
style welfare regime where trade unions tend to support the insiders’ interests), the senior core 
insiders are not in competition with highly-educated young. Here, then, is the central process 
of diploma inflation at work: whatever the level of education of the new cohorts, the young 
are in competition for new jobs, which are scarce, and not for the jobs of seniors.  
 
Scarring Effects and Generation Dyssocialization 
These transformations, then, are not simply a problem of youth, since they have permanent 
effects.  The cohorts that are lucky enough to avoid mass unemployment and find positions 
they enjoy will benefit from this positive launch for their whole life, and conversely, other 
unlucky generations will be subjected to negative consequences of early failure that will affect 
their life chances. Those who are “lost in transition” do not make up for their early 
difficulties.19 The assessment of the long-term impact of these early difficulties is central to 
this line of argument: if young, deprived generations do not catch up, a kind of long-term 
hysteresis effect appears, which we can call a “scar” or “scarring effect,” since the handicap 
seems definitive and enduring.  Age-period-cohort analysis shows that cohorts who 
experienced a difficult (favorable) entry because of a context of recession (expansion), 
continue to suffer (benefit) from a relative delay (advancement) in upward mobility when they 
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are compared to the average situation. The relative position of a collective cohort at age 30 is 
rapidly crystallized, and there does not appear to be a substantial catch-up effect later on.  
 How can we explain the lack of generational catch-up? Those who had benefited 
from a period of entry marked by a strong demand for skilled jobs experienced faster career 
and earlier labor experience at higher levels of responsibility, with better wages; these 
individuals (and the cohort they constitute at an aggregated level) retain the long-term benefits 
of the early opportunities they enjoyed, which will positively influence their future trajectory 
at any later age. For those who entered the labor market under difficult economic conditions, 
the periods of unemployment they faced, the necessity to accept less qualified jobs with lower 
wages, and the consecutive delays in career progression, imply negative stimuli for their own 
trajectories (decline in ambition, lack of valued work experiences) and could appear as a 
negative signal for future potential employers. The hypothesis we present here for France is 
that cohort-specific socialization contexts imply long-term opportunities and life chances for 
individuals and for their cohorts; when the difficulties disappear, the cohorts who faced these 
problems continue to suffer from long-term consequences of past handicaps. 
 In more concrete terms, the cohorts born during the forties, who benefited from 
the economic acceleration of the late sixties, were relatively privileged compared to the 
previous cohorts, and were also relatively advantaged when compared to the later cohorts 
because of the lack of progress for the young from 1975 to the present. We can generalize this 
observation: the cohorts who entered the labor force after 1975 and experienced an economic 
slump and mass unemployment have been the early victims of new generational dynamics, 
and they retain the long-term scars of their initial difficulties in the labor market. 
 An important point we cannot develop at length here concerns the consequences of 
educational expansion. If the level of education has increased in the cohorts born in 1950 to 
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1975, that positive trend was accompanied by a strong social devaluation of educational 
degrees.20 More specifically, the first cohorts of the baby boom have benefited from an 
expansion of education at a time when the rewards to education remained stable: even if there 
were twice as many baccalauréat recipients in the 1948 cohort than in the 1935 one, their 
likelihood of access to higher social or economic positions did not shrink. On the other hand, 
the generations that followed had to deal with a strong trend of devaluation in terms of the 
economic and social returns to education. The first consequence was a rush to the most valued 
and selective schools and degrees (to the elite grandes écoles, such as École Polytechnique, 
École Nationale d’Administation, Sciences-Po Paris, etc.) whose value remained stable, but 
whose population became more and more selective and perhaps more discriminating in terms 
of social origins.  The second consequence was a strong devaluation of less prestigious 
universities, which became less exclusive and had much smaller per capita endowments in 
comparison to the grandes écoles. Likewise, the best secondary schools have become more 
selective, with major consequences in terms of urban segregation. In the French case, the 
school system was traditionally the central institution of the Republic and at the heart of its 
idea of progress, providing strong support for French-style social democracy and meritocracy. 
The collapse of the value of degrees, then, implies a destabilization of this myth and a 
pessimistic outlook on progress, developments that we can expect to have political 
consequences.  
 Now that we can see many of the accumulating effects of this long-term slowdown, 
which began twenty-five years ago, we can compare two social and genealogical 
generations.21  For the first time in an era of peace, the youth of the new generation are not 
better off than their parents at the same age. In fact, the “1968 generation,” born around 1948, 
are the children of those born in 1918 who were young adults in World War II and who 
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worked in difficult conditions at the beginning of the trente glorieuses. The condition of the 
baby boomers was incomparably better than that of their parents. But the following 
genealogical generation, born around 1978―that is now between twenty-five and thirty years 
old―faces diminished opportunities of growth, not only because of an economic slump, but 
also because of their relatively poor outcomes in comparison to those of their own parents, 
who did very well.22 We now observe rising rates of downward social mobility connected to 
the proliferation of middle-class children who cannot find social positions comparable to 
those of their parents.  
 These diminishing resources and opportunities imply, for the newer generation, an 
exceptional risk of dyssocialization.23 Indeed, since Émile Durkheim and Robert Merton, we 
have known the dangers of a gap between aspirations (which result from early socialization, 
notably in the family) and achievements. Today’s generational transmission problem comes 
from a lack of correspondence between the values and ideas that the new generation receives 
(individual freedom, self achievement, valorization of leisure, etc.) and the realities it will 
face (centrality of the market, scarcity, lack of valuable jobs, boredom, etc.). All the 
generations of the twentieth century experienced that lack of correspondence between 
aspirations and achievement: the early baby-boom generations were socialized in the context 
of their parents’ values (scarcity, self-sacrifice, submission to a society where work remained 
the central issue, lack of leisure) linked to the hard times of the thirties and after, but they 
eventually experienced the trente glorieuses and the period of fast growth that offered them 
comfort, affluence, and opportunities for emancipation and leisure. For them, dyssocialisation 
was not so problematic.  
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Figure 7 - The “Folium of Descartes” curve of anomie  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The gap could be more difficult for the current young generations experiencing 
shrinking opportunities. As we have seen, the new generation apparently has longer 
educational careers and acquires higher academic qualifications than did its own parents, but 
the intense devaluation in social and economic terms of their improved educational assets 
could provoke a cruel confrontation with reality (i.e., “lost illusions”). The psychosocial 
difficulties of the new generation (notably, violent behavior, incivilities of many kinds, 
suicide, etc.) could be linked to the gap between what young people assume they deserve and 
what they are able to achieve.24  
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Figure 8. Relative suicide rate by age groups (100=national mean suicide rate) 
 
In France, the cohort analysis of relative suicide rates25 from age 25 to 69 demonstrates over 
the last forty years a strong cohort consequence of the economic slow down.  The 25-year-old 
population of 1975 (born in 1955) run higher risks of suicide than do people who were at age 
20 ten years before. The top rate of suicide at age 25 is reached in 1980 (born in 1955).  Then 
we detect the top at age 35 in 1990.  This suicide rate dynamic is a wave whose edge is 
shifting, and it follows the cohorts born in 1955-1960. The cohorts born between 1955 and 
1960 are the first cohorts of a generation sharing a risk of “oversuicidity,” compared to elder 
generations socialized in the context of the economic expansion of the trente glorieuses. 
These former cohorts are still distinguished, even at age 50 or later, by low levels of suicidity, 
whereas the new cohorts socialized in the context of job scarcity face higher risks that 
increase rapidly with age.  
 
Problems of Political Representation 
Destabilization in the generational distribution of well-being is accompanied by changes in 
access to political power. Profound changes have occurred in the access that various age 
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groups have to political representation and power, not to mention the interest they have in 
political issues. Here we can apply Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital decline regarding 
the replacement of the American “civic generation,” born between 1920 and 1940, by the 
following one.26 In the French context, the argument is more appropriate if we switch the term 
“civic” with “mobilized,” and the 1920-1940 birth cohorts with the 1940-1950 ones―in other 
words, the first “baby-boom generation.” In terms of participation in politics, this point is 
very clear when we consider the last thirty years. 
 Even if, for the most part, people lack interest in politics and political matters, the 
variations in participation in political discussions with friends are strong, particularly when 
we collapse the results by age groups. In the late seventies, 25 percent of those aged 30 to 34 
frequently engaged in political discussions with friends; that proportion had fallen to 12 
percent in the late nineties. The decline is severe when we compare this generation with older 
age groups, notably those between 50 and 55 years of age, who were significantly more likely 
to engage in political discussions when surveyed in the late nineties. Evidently, for people at 
age 30 in 1977 and age 50 in 1997 (i.e., the cohorts born near 1947), political socialization 
occurred during the late sixties in the context of the events of May 1968 and its consequences.  
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Figure 9. Frequency of political discussions with friends 
 
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2003, GESIS-ZACAT27  
 
An important characteristic of the “mobilized” generation of 1968 (the first cohorts of the 
baby boom, born in 1945-1950) is its stronger participation in collective action in its youth, 
which continued in the decades that followed.  By contrast, the specificity of the cohorts born 
after 1955 and particularly in the late 1960s is their lack of political mobilization: occasional 
political discussions and declining political participation, notably in traditional political 
institutions (voting, trade-union membership, parties, and even serving in elective office). 
Since the phenomenon is not so new now―after two decades―and since this generation’s 
lack of participation is so clearly visible in these institutions, French political leaders have 
become conscious of the long-term problem implied by the difficulty in attracting young 
members and militants. However, the effort required to change the trend is so massive that, 
despite the regrets expressed for the situation, nothing is done to change it.  
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 What is the evidence? For trade-union members, the dynamic is very strong, since the 
socialization effect seems to be significant: for a given cohort, the percentage of trade-union 
members at age 30, or even before, is a good predictor of this percentage at later ages; since it 
is about 2 percent in 1999 (and not 14 percent as in the early 1980s). True, there has been a 
slight revival of trade-union membership: the 2008 European values survey (France) shows a 
bounce back to rates of participation between those of 1990 and 1999.  But the overall picture 
for trade unions is one of stagnation rather than a real comeback.  
 
Figure 10. Members of Trade unions by age group from 1981 to 2008 (green line) in France  
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Source: European values survey cumulative file (1981-1999)28 
 
 When we consider the membership base of trade unions and parties, the newer 
generation’s participation is two or threefold below the early baby-boom’s rates. What about 
elected officials? At the Assemblée Nationale in 1981, 38.1 percent of the deputés were 44 
years old or less, compared to 15.1 percent in the new Assemblée Nationale of 2002. In fact, 
between 1997 and 2002, the most significant change is the drop in the age group between age 
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45 and 49, which fell from 18.5 percent to 12.3 percent: political representation of those born 
after 1953 is clearly declining. If the French electorate is growing older (the age of the 
average voter jumped from 45.5 to 47.5 years old between 1982 and 2002), its 
representatives, and those at the highest levels of decision-making who will shape the future 
of France, are aging at a much faster rate. The elections of 2007 confirm these trends: the age 
distribution of the Assemblée Nationale has never been so unbalanced: in 1981, for one 
deputé over age 60 we had one deputé below age 40, a ratio of one to one; in 2007, this 
balanced ratio jumps to one junior to nine seniors. A cohort analysis provides a strong 
generational vision of French politics.  
 
Figure 11. Members of Assemblée nationale  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Base Sycomore 
 
 The interpretation of this dynamic may be more subtle than a simple trend of aging: 
the political generation that had been socialized with the events of 1968 could enter very early 
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into the highest spheres of political institutions at the end of the 1970s and 1980s; now, many 
of the members of this generation are still active in politics and, since no new political 
upheaval has shifted the dynamics of representation, no new political generation appears to 
have emerged. Homogeneity in terms of the age of the French “classe politique” is now 
substantial, and the question of the transmission of political know-how and ideological and 
organizational legacy remains quite problematic for the coming decades. A consequence of 
this trend is the growing age gap between the real French society and its political 
representatives. Here, in terms of generations, political power is more accessible to those who 
are already dominant in terms of social and economic power, and the younger generations, 
who lack comparable material resources, also suffer from a loss of democratic influence, and 
even interest, since they are not engaged in political discussions. The lack of clear collective 
consciousness is a remarkable trait of the democratic debate at the present time. In fact, most 
young employees in many economic sectors are clearly conscious, at the individual level, of 
the asymmetric generational play in which they are acting. The political behavior of the 
young, characterized by distance from institutions and by stronger instability, is somehow 
rational: why would they invest political energy in a system where their present and future 
position is quite unclear? 
 In terms of political prospects, we should assess the consequences, notably for the 
sustainability of democracy, of the decline of political socialization. The first problem is the 
generational transmission of democracy, which supposes a strong civil society whose absence 
makes the socialization of newer cohorts problematic. Participation in democracy assumes 
shared social knowledge, political know-how, and the ability to insert oneself into the 
collective networks of political bargaining. Since many institutions are led today by a 
homogeneous group of baby boomers who will retire at the end of the decade, and since 
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almost nothing is done to socialize a new generation of successors, the sustainability of the 
political system is quite uncertain and the risk of generational micro-struggles is very high.  
 The second problem is a question of long-term decision making. Many weighty 
decisions at the national level (retirement, health, debt issues, etc.) are made by a political 
class whose remaining life span is generally shorter than that of the average population; the 
new generations that will have to face (and pay for) the long-term consequences of today’s 
choices do not participate in the decisions made about their own future, because they are 
presumed to be too young (even if they are 40 or older). That generational asymmetry or bias 
implies that many reforms are designed to have little immediate negative impact on elders and 
to delay payment of the costs of reform to the point that it threatens the future well-being of 
newer generations. Therefore, the social contract between generations seems to be both 
unclear and unstable. 
 
Problems of Welfare Regime Sustainability 
It may seem that social and structural reforms affect the entire population, whatever the age or 
generation.  But in fact, social welfare, welfare-state dynamics, and the welfare regime29 
change with the succession of cohorts. We have to analyze this point and its consequences for 
social reforms and in fine the sustainability of our contemporary welfare regime. This crucial 
factor could show that the expensive but efficient public health and pension schemes of the 
present day could collapse with the future cohort replacement of older “welfare generations” 
(born between 1925 and 1950) with the generations that follow. 
 When France’s public pay-as-you-go retirement system was created in 1946, the 
principle was that wage earners had to participate (and work) for at least thirty years before 
gaining access to a full pension. Thus, in 1946, those who were 35 or older―that is, born 
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before 1910―were generally excluded from the new system. Indeed, in large industries, in 
the public sector and in protected segments of the economy, arrangements had been 
developed to fulfill the contract, but most workers in smaller firms, those who had experience 
in agriculture or as self-employed business people, even though they were alive during the 
creation of this large system of welfare, were already too old to benefit from most of its 
outcomes: they were destined to fill the ranks of the impoverished elderly30 during a golden 
age for youth. Conversely, today, the new generation leaves school at age 21, loses three years 
in episodes of unemployment, freelance or non-standard, non-protected activities, and begins 
its participation in the retirement system at an average age of 24. If we add forty years of 
contributions (the current requirement which most French seniors can meet because they 
could start working much earlier than the youth of today) or 46.5 years (the time requirement 
proposed by the French employers union), we discover that our present system of early 
retirement (at an average age of 58, with an average level of income close to the employed 
population) is simply inaccessible for the newcomers.  In the most probable scenario, the 
generations of pensioners to come will not benefit from the generosity of the current system, 
even if they contribute heavily to the high level of protection that benefits today’s seniors. 
This point is even clearer when we analyze how the lower half or third (in educational terms) 
of the young generation, which has to wait for years before obtaining a stable position, is 
socialized within the working world and the political and welfare system.  We now socialize 
the young within a much more unequal system than in the early seventies, and the greater 
inequalities within today’s younger generation will have consequences for their future 
trajectory.  
 Some optimistic observers of these trends argue that with a long-term annual rate of 
growth of about 2 percent, the retirement system will eventually balance itself out. Moreover, 
 28
when the baby-boom generation begins to retire, a process already underway since 2007, new 
jobs will be available for the younger generation. However, the risk is double here: on the one 
hand, perhaps we overestimate the number of new positions that will be created, since 
productivity gains might be obtained at the expense of new entrants; on the other hand, even if 
new positions become available, members of even newer generations could seize these new 
opportunities, and an intermediate sacrificed generation, yesterday too young and tomorrow 
too old, could be the double victim of social change. King Lear could suggest another 
troubling prospect: long wars of succession among competing generations.  
 If the existence of such dynamics can be established for the pension system, the same 
kind of argument can be developed for many other aspects of the French welfare system (the 
health care system, social expenditures for families, education, etc.). In fact, our French 
egalitarian system of large homogeneous middle classes of wage earners, which reached its 
apogee with the generations born during the 1930s and 1940s, seems to be disappearing 
progressively in a cohort dynamic of dismantlement and disentitlement that the newer 
generations are experiencing.  
 
Conclusion  
If in the United States much of the struggle over downward mobility takes the form of intra-
cohort disruption and conflict, in France the key problem is intergenerational decline.  France 
is less a country of “falling from grace” 31 than of the incapacity of the young generation to 
inherit the wage earner middle class status of their parents because of the lack of positions in 
the “new” middle class. But the young generations experience a strong rise in education, and 
are more often than not the children of upwardly mobile baby-boomers.  They often also 
experience the downward dynamics that come from holding lower-middle-class positions, and 
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this contradiction can produce a kind of generational dismemberment of the “new” middle 
class.  
 The emergence of a immense génération précaire, youth who paradoxically are 
middle-class in terms of education and underclass in terms of socio-economic position, is the 
outcome of social policies that gave opportunity and protection to mid-aged and senior 
populations at the expense of juniors. This development manifests a generational bias in 
political choices corresponding in some respects to the demographic imbalance of age groups 
in trade unions and political parties.  
 For the past three decades the main consequence of this dynamic has been the 
political apathy of the young, interrupted intermittently by brief episodes of street 
mobilizations or protests, such as the December 2005 riots in the lower-class suburbs or the 
2006 mobilization against the government’s employment policy reform.  Such events 
notwithstanding, apathy remains the principal response of the young, from the top to the 
bottom of the social scale. The alumni of the most prestigious and selective institutions of 
higher education (the École Normale Supérieure, École Polytechnique, Sciences Po, and the 
like) are prepared to participate to international competition:  for them, response to challenge 
is a choice of individual effort much more than collective mobilization. Most of these 
graduates enter the labor force and prefer their own cursus honorum to collective 
mobilization. The “real” middle class that is educated in less selective or prestigious 
universities can face severe difficulties entering the labor force, and for them the response to 
challenge is an oscillation between a lack of political participation, left-wing ideological 
commitment, and short periods of political mobilization and activism. The less educated and 
the lower-class young remain in a more anomic situation where lack of political integration 
goes hand in hand with extreme frustration and a hostility to politics in general. Hence, the 
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French context is characterized by the absence of the young as a political force and by the 
absence of young politicians in government.  
 The political consequences are difficult to forecast and control, especially as 
young adults and their parents become more conscious of the social downward mobility of the 
new generation, and as parents begin to share the pessimism of their children.32 The situation 
is made even more unstable by the approaching retirement age of a great many political 
leaders, the accumulating frustrations of the young, and the increasing gap between the 
population’s aspirations and the decisions its leaders are making. Up to now, most political 
groups, unions or movements organized by or for the young have failed to transform the 
situation or institutionalize collective interests, despite widely felt desires that they do so. 
Striking, too, is the degree to which these trends are individualized at the level of 
consciousness: the collective mobilizations of the “movement génération précaire” have failed 
to aggregate atomized individuals in an enduring way, although they have succeeded in 
spreading a broad social consciousness about these problems. Right now, most mobilisations 
in the middle-class young are toward the (extreme) left wing, but there is a risk that anomic 
individualism could be transformed into the kind social pessimism that reinforces a trend 
toward rightwing authoritarianism, notably in the lower classes.  This is one way to interpret 
the victory of Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2007 presidential elections, in so far as he gave voice to 
demands for strong authority.  By the same token, we may also see a backlash in 2012 with a 
groundswell of participation by the young in anti-Sarkozy movements and parties.  
 The problems analyzed here, however, reach far beyond the election day of 2012 
and are rooted in long-run trends. The consequences of these problems, in political terms, are 
complicated and quite pervasive: the 2002 presidential elections had demonstrated the 
destabilization of the lower middle classes and of the young generations who did not vote for 
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the socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin. The year 2005 showed five emerging movements in the 
young: the secondary school pupils against the reform of the baccalauréat (the François 
Fillon reform, named for the former minister of education), the “precarity generation” 
mobilization, the “30-something movement,” and, last but not least, the October-November 
2005 suburban riots, The long 2009 movement inside universities, whereby fifty-nine 
universities were disrupted for weeks, is only the most recent event. This sequence of protests 
will by no means end here, because despite the anomic aspect of these mobilizations their 
objective underling causes are still developing.  Under these conditions, apathy may yet well 
abate, and the rise of the young generation as a stronger political force may well yet come. If 
modern France is the child of revolution, it remains the country of mobilizations:  might we 
yet be on the eve of revolution? 
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